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                               CHAPTER EIGHT

          Part Eight:  The In-accordance-with-the-Rule Chapter
          ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~



       71. Should any bhikkhu, admonished by the bhikkhus in
       accordance with a rule, say, "Friends, I will not train
       myself under this training rule until I have put questions
       about it to another bhikkhu, experienced and learned in the
       discipline," it is to be confessed.  Bhikkhus, (a training
       rule) is to be understood, is to be asked about, is to be
       pondered.  This is the proper course here.

   This rule deals with cases where a bhikkhu tries to excuse himself
   from following any of the training rules, without showing
   out-and-out disrespect for the rule or the person admonishing him.
   (If he showed out-and-out disrespect, the case would come under
   Pacittiya 54.)  The factors for the full offense here are three.

     1) //Object//:  One has been admonished by a fellow bhikkhu who
   cites a rule formulated in the Vinaya.

     2) //Intention//:  One does not want to train oneself in line with
   the rule.

     3) //Effort//:  One says something to the effect that one will not
   train in line with the rule.

     Only two of these factors -- object and effort -- require
   explanation.

     Object.  Only if the other bhikkhu cites a rule in the Vinaya is
   this factor grounds for a pacittiya.  If he criticizes one's
   actions, citing standards of behavior outside of the Vinaya -- e.g.,
   he says that one has been acting out of greed, anger, delusion, or
   fear -- this factor becomes grounds for a dukkata.

     If the person admonishing one is not a bhikkhu, then regardless of
   whether he/she cites a rule in the Vinaya or standards of behavior
   outside of the Vinaya, this factor is again grounds for a dukkata.

     As under Pacittiya 54, whether or not one views the admonition as
   valid is not an issue here.

     Effort.  Looking at the Vibhanga's discussion of this factor, it
   would appear to cover only cases where one used the precise words
   mentioned in the training rule, but the K/Commentary -- drawing
   probably on the Great Standards -- expands it to cover any case
   where one says something as a ploy to excuse oneself from following
   the rule without showing disrespect.  Examples might include:  "I'll
   worry about that rule when I come to it." "I don't have time for
   that right now." "I've been wondering:  Do you really think that
   that rule applies in this day and age?  It gets in the way of our
   spreading the Dhamma."  In other words, this factor closes any
   loopholes left by Pacittiya 54.

     Non-offenses.  According to the Vibhanga, the only way to avoid an
   offense in situations like this is to say that one will learn about
   the rule and train in line with it.  As the no-offense clauses to
   Pacittiya 54 make clear, though, if one has been admonished with any
   interpretation of a rule that differs from one's teachers', one may
   avoid an offense simply by stating that one's teachers taught
   differently.

       Summary:  Saying something as a ploy to excuse oneself  from
       training under a training rule when being admonished by
       another bhikkhu for a breach of the rule is a pacittiya
       offense.



                                 * * *



       72. Should any bhikkhu, when the Patimokkha is being
       repeated, say, "Why are these lesser and minor training
       rules repeated when they lead only to anxiety, bother and
       confusion?" the criticism of the training rules is to be
       confessed.

       "Now at that time the Blessed One gave a talk to the
       bhikkhus on the subject of discipline.  He spoke in praise
       of discipline, in praise of the mastery of discipline, and
       in praise of Ven. Upali, referring to him again and again.
       The bhikkhus (said), '...Come, friends, let's study
       discipline with Ven. Upali.'  They and many other bhikkhus
       -- elders, newly ordained, and those in between -- studied
       discipline with Ven. Upali.

       "Then the thought occurred to some group-of-six bhikkhus:
       'Now, friends, many bhikkhus...are studying discipline with
       Ven. Upali.  If they become well-versed in the discipline,
       they will push us and pull us around however they like,
       whenever they like, and as long as they like.  Come,
       friends, let's criticize the discipline.'  Then the
       group-of-six bhikkhus, approaching the bhikkhus, said, 'Why
       are these lesser and minor training rules repeated when they
       lead only to anxiety, bother, and confusion?'"

   The full offense here has three factors.

     1) //Object//:  another bhikkhu.

     2) //Effort//:  One criticizes the discipline in his presence

     3) //Intention//:  so as to discourage the study of the
   discipline.

     Object & effort.  There is a pacittiya for criticizing the
   discipline in the presence of a bhikkhu; and a dukkata for
   criticizing the Dhamma in his presence, or criticizing either the
   discipline or the Dhamma in the presence of an unordained person.

     The training rule would seem to indicate that these actions are
   grounds for an offense only while the Patimokkha is being recited or
   rehearsed, but the no-offense clauses in the Vibhanga give no
   allowance to criticize the discipline at other times, and the
   K/Commentary follows the Vibhanga in not making the recitation of
   the Patimokkha a necessary factor for the offense here.  In other
   words, the factor of effort here is fulfilled if one criticizes the
   discipline at //any// time.

     Intention.  This factor is fulfilled either if one's intention is
   to keep that particular bhikkhu from studying or mastering the
   discipline, or if one wants the discipline in general to disappear
   from lack of study.

     Further action.  A bhikkhu who makes a concerted effort to speak
   in dispraise of the Dhamma or discipline may be subject to an act of
   censure or banishment, depending on the seriousness of the case
   (Cv.I.4.1; Cv.I.14.2).

     Non-offenses.  There is no offense if, without intending to
   criticize the discipline, one suggests to another person that he/she
   master the Suttas or the Abhidhamma first, before mastering the
   discipline.

       Summary:  Criticizing the discipline in the presence of
       another bhikkhu, in hopes of preventing its study, is a
       pacittiya offense.



                                 * * *



       73. Should any bhikkhu, when the Patimokkha is being recited
       every half-month, say, "Just now have I heard that this
       case, too, is handed down in the Patimokkha, is included in
       the Patimokkha, and comes up for recitation every
       half-month;" and if other bhikkhus should know, "That
       bhikkhu has already sat through two or three recitations of
       the Patimokkha, if not more," the bhikkhu is not exempted
       for being ignorant.  Whatever the offense he has committed,
       he is to be dealt with in accordance with the rule; and in
       addition, his deception is to be exposed:  "It is no gain
       for you, friend, it is ill-done, that when the Patimokkha is
       being recited, you do not pay proper attention and take it
       to heart."  Here the deception is to be confessed.

   To summarize the Vibhanga:  If a bhikkhu -- when the recitation of
   the Patimokkha comes to a rule he has violated -- tries to excuse
   himself through the sort of pretence cited in the rule, he
   immediately incurs a dukkata if he has already listened to the
   Patimokkha in full three times or more.  The other bhikkhus may then
   expose his deception through a formal act of the Community.  If he
   then continues with the pretence, he incurs a pacittiya.  If they do
   not bring the formal act against him, though, he incurs a dukkata
   for each effort he makes in keeping up the pretence.  There is no
   offense, though, if he is not feigning ignorance or if he has not
   yet heard the Patimokkha in full at least three times.

     Obviously, these explanations were written when Pali was the
   bhikkhus' native language, and the recitation of the Patimokkha in
   Pali offered the opportunity to learn the rules, along with the
   opportunity to feign ignorance without telling an out-and-out lie.
   In other words, one could say immediately after the recitation of a
   particular rule, "Just now have I heard that this rule is in the
   Patimokkha," and strictly speaking it would be true:  One //has//
   just heard it, even if for the umpteenth time, but one hopes that
   the other bhikkhus will be deceived into inferring that one has just
   heard it for the first time.

     At any rate, the discussion of this rule in the Vibhanga and
   commentaries makes no exceptions for bhikkhus whose native language
   is not Pali, and since the Patimokkha is available in a number of
   translations, the "grace period" in which one is expected to be
   ignorant -- three recitations covers a month to a month and a half
   -- is not too short a time for a new bhikkhu to read and remember
   the rules in translation.

     The factors for the full offense here are three.

     1) //Object//:  One has heard the Patimokkha in full for at least
   three times, one has tried to feign ignorance, but the bhikkhus have
   brought a formal act against one, exposing one's deceit.

     2) //Intention//:  One wants to deceive the bhikkhus into
   believing that one is ignorant of the rule one has broken.

     3) //Effort//:  One says a half-truth to deceive them.
   (Out-and-out lies would come under Pacittiya 1.)

     Perception is not a mitigating factor here.  If the act exposing
   one's deceit has been properly carried out, then regardless of
   whether or not one perceives it as valid, one incurs a pacittiya for
   trying to deceive the bhikkhus any further.  If it has been
   improperly carried out, one incurs a dukkata for trying to deceive
   them further, regardless of how one perceives the act.

     Non-offenses.  There is no offense if one has heard the Patimokkha
   in full less than three times, or if one is not intending to deceive
   anyone.

       Summary:  Using half-truths to deceive others into believing
       that one is ignorant of the rules in the Patimokkha, after
       one has already heard the Patimokkha in full three times,
       and a formal act exposing one's deceit has been brought
       against one, is a pacittiya offense.



                                 * * *



       74. Should any bhikkhu, angered and displeased, give a blow
       to (another) bhikkhu, it is to be confessed.

   The factors for the full offense here are three.

     1) //Object//:  another bhikkhu.

     2) //Effort//:  One gives him a blow

     3) //Intention//:  out of anger.

     Object.  A bhikkhu is grounds for the full offense here; anyone
   unordained, grounds for a dukkata.  According to the Commentary,
   //anyone unordained// includes animals as well as higher forms of
   life, such as human or celestial beings.

     Effort.  This factor is fulfilled whether one gives a blow --

     with one's own body (hitting with a fist, jabbing with an elbow,
       kicking with a foot);
     with something attached to the body (e.g., a stick, a knife); or
     with something that can be "thrown" (this includes such things as
       throwing a rock, shooting an arrow, or firing a gun).  According
       to the Vibhanga, this last category includes throwing "even a
       lotus leaf," which shows that the blow need not be painful in
       order to fulfill this factor.

     This factor also includes such things as twisting the other
   person's arm behind his back or wringing his neck:  It is fulfilled
   as soon as one touches his body with the intent to do these things.

     Intention.  If one gives a blow for reasons other than anger, the
   action does not fall under this rule.  Thus, for instance, if one
   thumps a fellow bhikkhu on the back to help dislodge something
   caught in his throat, there is no offense.  And as the Commentary
   notes, if -- motivated by lust -- one gives a blow to a woman, one
   incurs the full penalty under Sanghadisesa 2.

     For some reason, the Commentary says that if one cuts off the nose
   or ear of a fellow bhikkhu in order to disfigure him, one incurs
   only a dukkata.  As the Vinaya Mukha points out, though, there is no
   basis in the Vibhanga or in reason for this statement.  It is hard
   to imagine anyone doing this unless motivated by anger, and cutting
   another person would come under the factor of giving a blow with
   something connected with the body.

     "Result" is not a factor here.  Whether or not the other person is
   hurt -- or how badly he/she is hurt -- does not affect the offense.
   If one intends simply to hurt the other person, but he/she happens
   to die from one's blow, the case is treated under this rule, rather
   than under Parajika 3.  In other words, the penalty is a pacittiya
   if the victim is a bhikkhu, and a dukkata if not.

     Non-offenses.  According to the Vibhanga, there is no offense for
   a bhikkhu who, trapped in a difficult situation, gives a blow
   "desiring freedom."  The Commentary's discussion of this point shows
   that it includes what we at present would call self-defense; and the
   K/Commentary's analysis of the factors of the offense here shows
   that even if anger or displeasure arises in one's mind in cases like
   this, there is no penalty.

       Summary:  Giving a blow to another bhikkhu when motivated by
       anger is a pacittiya offense.



                                 * * *



       75. Should any bhikkhu, angered and displeased, raise his
       hand against (another) bhikkhu, it is to be confessed.

   This rule is similar to the preceding one, differing only in the
   factor of effort:  //Raising one's hand// means raising any part of
   one's body (the hand, the foot, etc.) or anything attached to the
   body (a stick, a rock, a gun, a bow and arrow) in a threatening
   manner.

     The Commentary notes that if one intends only to raise one's hand,
   but then accidentally gives a blow, one incurs a dukkata.  The
   Sub-commentary explains this in the only way that would make sense:
   One incurs the dukkata for the blow, but a pacittiya for raising the
   hand in the first place.

     The Sub-commentary also notes that if an animal, for example, is
   making a mess and a bhikkhu raises his hand against it, this would
   be included under "desiring freedom" -- i.e., from the mess -- and
   so would not be an offense.

       Summary:  Making a threatening gesture against another
       bhikkhu when motivated by anger is a pacittiya offense.



                                 * * *



       76. Should any bhikkhu charge a bhikkhu with an unfounded
       sanghadisesa (offense), it is to be confessed.

     Here again the factors for the full offense are three.

     1) //Object//:  another bhikkhu.

     2) //Perception//:  One perceives him to be innocent of the
   offense one is charging him with.

     3) //Effort//:  One accuses him in his presence -- or gets someone
   else to accuse him in his presence -- of having committed a
   sanghadisesa offense.

     If one makes an unfounded charge accusing another bhikkhu of
   having committed a lesser offense or of falling away from right
   views, one incurs a dukkata.  The same penalty holds for making an
   unfounded charge accusing an unordained person of having committed a
   wrong doing or of falling away from right views.

     The topic of unfounded charges is a complex one, and has already
   been covered in detail under Sanghadisesa 8.  Additional points may
   be inferred from the discussion of that rule, the differences being
   that intention is not a factor here, and the change in effort -- one
   is accusing the other bhikkhu of a sanghadisesa or lesser offense --
   changes the seriousness of the penalty.

     Non-offenses.  As under Sanghadisesa 8, there is no offense if one
   makes the accusation -- or gets someone else to make the accusation
   -- when one thinks it to be true, even if it turns out that the
   other bhikkhu is actually not guilty of the offense.

       Summary:  Making an unfounded charge to another bhikkhu --
       or getting someone else to make the charge to him -- that he
       is guilty of a sanghadisesa offense is a pacittiya offense.



                                 * * *



       77. Should any bhikkhu purposefully provoke anxiety in
       (another) bhikkhu, (thinking,) "This way, even for just a
       moment, he will have no peace" -- if doing it for just this
       reason and no other -- it is to be confessed.

   The Vinaya Mukha's explanation for this rule is worth quoting at
   length:

       "There are people who normally tend to be anxious about one
       thing or another....If someone speaks to a bhikkhu such as
       this of contingencies that run counter to the Buddha's
       ordinances and are impossible to know -- e.g., 'When you
       were ordained, how can you know that all the qualifications
       (for a valid formal act) were fulfilled?  If they were
       lacking, doesn't that mean you aren't really ordained?' --
       even this is enough to set him worrying, giving him all
       sorts of anguish.  A bhikkhu who is unrestrained and who --
       looking for fun with no concern for how his friends will
       suffer -- takes such matters to tell them, is penalized with
       a pacittiya in this rule."

     The full offense here has three factors.

     1) //Object//:  another bhikkhu.

     2) //Effort//:  One mentions that he might have broken a rule
   unknowingly.

     3) //Intention//:  One's purpose is to cause him anxiety, even if
   just for a moment.

     Object.  A bhikkhu here is grounds for a pacittiya; an unordained
   person, grounds for a dukkata.

     Effort.  The Vibhanga gives a few examples of rules the other
   person might have broken unknowingly:  He may have drunk liquor, may
   have eaten food at the wrong time, or may have sat in private with a
   woman, all without knowing it. (Although this last would not be an
   offense if done unknowingly, it is close enough to an offense that
   the mention of the possibility would cause an ignorant bhikkhu
   anxiety.)  In the origin story, some group-of-six bhikkhus made
   insinuating remarks to the group of 17 that since they were ordained
   when they were less than 20 years old, they were not really
   ordained.  (Again, since the group of 17 were the instigators for
   that rule, they were not subject to it.)  All of this shows that
   this factor is fulfilled by any statement one might make to another
   bhikkhu insinuating that he may have broken a rule, even if the
   action one mentions is not strictly speaking an offense.

     Intention.  If, not wanting to cause the other person anxiety, one
   has other reasons for mentioning rules he/she might have broken
   unknowingly -- e.g., one seriously thinks that he may have been
   improperly ordained -- there is no offense.

       Summary:  Saying to another bhikkhu that he may have broken
       a rule unknowingly, simply for the purpose of causing him
       anxiety, is a pacittiya offense.



                                 * * *



       78. Should any bhikkhu stand eavesdropping on bhikkhus when
       they are arguing, quarreling, and disputing, thinking, "I
       will overhear what they say" -- if doing it for just this
       reason and no other -- it is to be confessed.

       "Now at that time some group-of-six bhikkhus were quarreling
       with the well-behaved bhikkhus.  The well-behaved bhikkhus
       (meeting among themselves) said, 'These group-of-six
       bhikkhus are shameless.  There's no way you can argue with
       them.'

       "Later, the group-of-six bhikkhus said to them, 'Why do you
       disgrace us by calling us shameless?'

       "'But how did you overhear?'

       "'We stood eavesdropping on you.'"

   The factors for the full offense here are three.

     1) //Object//:  other bhikkhus who are involved in an argument
   over an issue.

     2) //Effort//:  One stands eavesdropping on them,

     3) //Intention//:  with the purpose of using what they say against
   them, either in a formal act (reproving, reminding, or reprimanding
   them) or simply to make them feel remorseful or ashamed.

     Object.   According to the Vibhanga, the words, //arguing,
   quarreling, and disputing// refer to arguments over issues (see
   Pacittiya 63).  The Commentary says that this refers to one kind of
   issue -- disputes -- but accusations would appear to fit here as
   well.

     This factor is fulfilled regardless of whether the two parties in
   the dispute/accusation are confronting each other or -- as in the
   origin story -- one party is talking in private.  It is also
   fulfilled regardless of whether or not one is already involved in
   the dispute oneself.

     Bhikkhus involved in an argument are grounds for a pacittiya;
   unordained people involved in an argument, grounds for a dukkata.
   Perception -- e.g., whether or not one perceives the bhikkhus as
   bhikkhus -- is not a mitigating factor here.

     People who are not involved in an argument are not grounds for an
   offense.  Thus there is no penalty in eavesdropping on a Dhamma talk
   or on a bhikkhu sitting in private with a woman, to see what they
   will say to each other.

     Effort.  The Vibhanga goes into a fair amount of detail on this
   factor, allotting the offenses as follows (assuming the other
   factors to be fulfilled as well):

     One goes with the purpose of eavesdropping on the other party (%):
       a dukkata.  One stays in one place eavesdropping on them:  a
       pacittiya.

     One is walking behind the other part, and speeds up one's steps to
       overhear them:  a dukkata.  One stays in one place eavesdropping
       on them:  a pacittiya.

     One is walking ahead of the other party and slows down to overhear
       them:  a dukkata.  One stays in one place eavesdropping on them:
       a pacittiya.

     One is sitting, standing, or lying down in place, and the other
       party happens to walk past (%):  One should cough, clear one's
       throat, or (the K/Commentary states) say, "I'm here."  Not to do
       so entails a pacittiya.

     At present, surreptitiously reading another person's mail would
   seem to fulfill this factor as well.

     Intention.  According to the Vibhanga, there is no offense if one
   happens to overhear bhikkhus arguing and goes away thinking, "I
   won't get involved," or "I will free myself" ("by declaring my
   innocence," says the Commentary).

       Summary:  Eavesdropping on bhikkhus involved in an argument
       over an issue -- with the intention of using what they say
       against them -- is a pacittiya offense.



                                 * * *



       79. Should any bhikkhu, having given consent (by proxy) to a
       formal act carried out in accordance with the rule, later
       complain (about the act), it is to be confessed.

       "Now at that time some group-of-six bhikkhus were indulging
       in bad habits but protested when a formal act was being
       carried out against any one of their group.  Now it happened
       that the Community was meeting on some other business, and
       the group-of-six bhikkhus, involved in making robes, sent
       their consent with one of their members.  Then the
       Community, thinking, 'Look, friends, one of the group-of-six
       has come alone.  Let's carry out a formal act against him,'
       did just that.

       "He then returned to where the group-of-six bhikkhus were
       staying.  They asked him, 'What, friend, did the Community
       do?'"

       "'They carried out a formal act against me.'

       "'That wasn't what we gave our consent for, that they would
       carry out a formal act against you.  If we had known that
       they would carry out a formal act against you, we wouldn't
       have given our consent!'"


   Formal acts.  A formal act is a procedure the Community follows in
   settling any of the four kinds of issues:  disputes, accusations,
   offenses, or duties.  The Vinaya gives the pattern for settling each
   of the various issues falling into these four categories:  the
   minimum number of bhikkhus that has to be present, the
   qualifications (positive or negative) of the individual or situation
   warranting the act, and the formal procedure -- a declaration, a
   motion, a motion with one announcement, or a motion with three
   announcements -- to follow in carrying out the act.  An act carried
   out in accordance with these patterns is said to be carried out in
   accordance with the rule.

     However, for a formal act to be valid and irreversible, it must be
   carried out not only in accordance with the rule, but also by a
   complete assembly (Mv.IX.2.4).  This point is to prevent small
   factions from carrying out acts as they like.  When this point was
   first raised, the question arose, How many bhikkhus are needed for
   an assembly to be complete?  All the bhikkhus in the world?  All the
   bhikkhus in a particular monastery?  The Buddha's answer was, All
   the bhikkhus in a monastery, and he gave permission for the bhikkhus
   to delineate boundaries (//sima//) so as to determine who did and
   did not have to join in the act for the assembly to be complete
   (Mv.II.5.2,6.1,12.7).  Later, he gave permission that an ill bhikkhu
   living within the boundary did not have to attend the meeting, but
   could give his consent by proxy, through word or gesture, and the
   assembly would still be regarded as complete (Mv.II.23.1-2).

     Thus a complete assembly is defined as follows:  All the bhikkhus
   within the boundary are either present at the meeting (sitting
   within 1.25 meters of one another in the meeting) or have given
   their consent by proxy, and no one makes a valid protest against the
   act's being carried out (Mv.IX.3.5-6).  (An invalid protest would be
   one made by someone who is not a bhikkhu, by a bhikkhu who is
   insane, possessed by a spirit, outside the boundary, or suspended
   from the Community, or by the bhikkhu against whom the act is being
   carried out (Mv.IX.4.7-8).)

     Before we go on to discuss this rule, there are a few added points
   concerning the origin story we should touch on:

     1) When a bhikkhu makes a valid protest, he does not need to
       justify it.  In other words, he can make protest simply because
       he doesn't agree with the act, and his protest stands regardless
       of whether or not he can find any basis for it in the Dhamma and
       Vinaya.

     2) One Community may not carry out a formal act against another
       Community (Mv.IX.2.3).  What this means is that they may carry it
       out against no more than three bhikkhus at a time.  This is why
       the group-of-six bhikkhus were able to protect one another from
       being subject to a formal act, for there were usually more than
       three of them at any one meeting of the Community.  Even though
       the ones against whom the formal act was being carried out had no
       right to protest, their friends did, and they took advantage of
       their right.

     3) In the passage where the Buddha gives permission for bhikkhus
       to give their consent by proxy (Mv.II.23.1-2), he states that
       this permission applies to ill bhikkhus.  Yet in the origin
       stories to this rule and the following one, the group of six are
       not ill, they give their consent by proxy, and the act carried
       out with their consent is considered to be valid.  None of the
       texts make note of this point, but it seems to indicate that
       //ill// in this context covers not only physical illness, but
       also any other serious inconvenience that prevents one from
       joining in the meeting.

     The factors for the offense under this rule are three.

     1) //Object//:  a valid formal act to which one has given one's
   consent.

     2) //Perception//:  One perceives it as valid.

     3) //Effort//:  One complains about it.

     Object & perception.  The various permutations of these factors
   are as follows:

     a valid act that one perceives to be valid:  grounds for a
       pacittiya;
     an invalid act that one perceives to be valid:  grounds for a
       dukkata;
     an act that one is doubtful about, regardless of its actual
       validity:  grounds for a dukkata;
     an act that one perceives to be invalid, regardless of its actual
       validity:  grounds for no offense.

     Effort.  Any expression of displeasure with the act would fulfill
   this factor.  If, however, one states that the act was not carried
   out in accordance with the rule, then regardless of whether or not
   one had given one's consent, the case would fall under Pacittiya 63,
   rather than here.

     Non-offenses.  There is no offense in complaining about the act if
   one perceives it as having been carried out not in accordance with
   the rule, by an incomplete assembly, or against someone who did not
   warrant such an act.  This exemption holds regardless of whether, in
   fact, the act was valid or not.

       Summary:  Complaining about a formal act of the Community to
       which one gave one's consent -- if one knows that the act
       was carried out in accordance with the rule -- is a
       pacittiya offense.



                                 * * *



       80. Should any bhikkhu, when deliberation is being carried
       on in the Community, get up from his seat and leave without
       having given consent, it is to be confessed.

   The origin story here is a sequel to the one for the preceding rule.

       "Now at that time the Community was meeting on some
       business, and the group-of-six bhikkhus, involved in making
       robes, sent their consent with one of their group.  Then the
       Community, thinking, 'We'll carry out the formal act
       (against the one member of the group-of-six) that was our
       //real// purpose in meeting,' set forth a motion.  The
       bhikkhu -- thinking, 'It's just in this way that they carry
       out formal acts against us one at a time.  Well, who are you
       going to carry out //this// act against?' -- without giving
       his consent, got up from his seat and left."

     As explained under the preceding rule, a bhikkhu has no right to
   protest when the Community is carrying out a formal act against him.
   However, the Community may not carry out an act against a bhikkhu
   who is not in its midst (see Adhikarana-Samatha 1), and any act is
   invalid if carried out when there is a bhikkhu within the boundary
   who is not in the meeting and who has not given his consent.  The
   bhikkhu in the origin story took advantage of these two principles
   to escape from the formal act being carried out against himself, and
   the Buddha then formulated this rule to impose a penalty on any
   bhikkhu who tried the same maneuver in the future.

     There are four factors for the full offense.

     1) //Object//:  A formal act has been started but has yet to be
   finished, and is being carried out in a valid manner.

     2) //Perception//:  One perceives it as being carried out in a
   valid manner.

     3) //Intention//:  One wants to invalidate the act or to keep the
   group from carrying it out.

     4) //Effort//:  One goes beyond one //hatthapasa// (1.25 m.) from
   the bhikkhus sitting in the meeting, without having first given
   one's consent.

     Object & perception.  The various permutations of these two factor
   are as follows:

     a valid act that one perceives to be valid:  grounds for a
       pacittiya;
     an invalid act that one perceives to be valid:  grounds for a
       dukkata;
     an act that one is doubtful about, regardless of its actual
       validity:  grounds for a dukkata;
     an act that one perceives as invalid, regardless of its actual
       validity:  grounds for no offense.

     According to the Vibhanga, the time period covered by this factor
   begins at the point where the matter has been brought up in the
   Community -- or a motion has been set forth -- and ends when the
   Community's decision has been announced.

     The Commentary, in discussing this point, says that, in the case
   of an accusation, the point when the matter has been brought up is
   when both sides have stated their initial positions, and a bhikkhu
   has been authorized to cross-examine them.

     Effort.  The Vibhanga divides the effort here into three parts and
   allots the penalties as follows:

     One gets up to go:  a dukkata.
     One reaches the distance of one //hatthapasa// from the meeting:
       another dukkata.
     One passes beyond the distance of one //hatthapasa//:  a
       pacittiya.

     The K/Commentary adds that one must also remain within the
   boundary (//sima//) for this factor to be fulfilled, but the
   Vibhanga makes no mention of this, and there seems no reason to
   adopt it.  If we did adopt it, it would mean that if a formal act
   were being carried out against a bhikkhu, and he left the meeting
   and the boundary to avoid it, he would be committing no offense.
   Thus it seems better to stick with the Vibhanga and say that this
   factor is fulfilled when one goes beyond one hatthapasa away from
   the meeting, regardless of whether one then stays within the
   boundary or not.

     Intention.  There is no offense if, without giving one's consent,
   one leaves the meeting for purposes other than to invalidate the
   act.  Examples in the Vibhanga include:

     One is ill.
     One has to do something (e.g., prepare or give medicine) for one
       who is ill.
     One is overcome with the need to urinate or defecate.
     One leaves, without desiring to invalidate the act, with the
       thought, "I'll come right back."

     In all of these cases, though, if possible, it is best to give
   one's consent before going.

     Non-offenses.  In addition to the above cases, there is also no
   offense if one leaves a meeting without giving one's consent with
   the purpose of invalidating the act if one perceives that:

     the act will lead to quarreling, a crack, or a split in the
       Community; or
     the act is being carried out not in accordance with the rule, by
       an incomplete assembly, or against/for a person who doesn't
       warrant it.

       Summary:  Getting up and leaving a meeting of the Community
       in the midst of a valid formal act -- without having first
       given one's consent to the act and with the intention of
       invalidating it -- is a pacittiya offense.



                                 * * *



       81. Should any bhikkhu, (acting as part of) a Community in
       concord, give robe-cloth (to an individual bhikkhu) and
       later complain, "The bhikkhus apportion the Community's
       gains according to friendship," it is to be confessed.

   Apportioning the Community's gains.  The Cullavagga (VI.15.2)
   contains a passage saying that no one -- not even the Community
   itself -- can take any of the following items belonging to the
   Community and turn them over to individual ownership:  monasteries
   or monastery land; dwellings or land on which dwellings are built;
   furnishings, such as couches, chairs, or mattresses; metal vessels
   or tools; building materials or articles made of pottery or wood.
   The collective term for these goods is //garubhanda//, or heavy
   articles.  The penalty for handing any of the Community's garubhanda
   over to individual ownership is a thullaccaya.  In the origin story
   to Parajika 4, the Buddha states that a bhikkhu who gives the
   Community's garubhanda to a lay person is one of the five great
   thieves in the world.

     Light articles (//lahubhanda//) belonging to the Community,
   though, may be turned over to individual ownership -- of a bhikkhu
   or novice -- but only when the proper procedures are followed.  The
   usual pattern is to appoint a Community official, through a formal
   act, to be responsible for making sure that such items be
   distributed fairly to the members of the Community eligible to
   receive them.  Such officials include distributors of robe-cloth, of
   food, of fruit, of non-staple foods, and of small accessories, such
   as scissors, sandals, water strainers, etc. (Cv.VI.21).

     In addition, this training rule shows that a Community acting as a
   whole may take light articles belonging to it and turn them over to
   individual bhikkhus or novices.  (According to the K/Commentary to
   Pacittiya 79, this can be done with a simple declaration
   (//apalokana//), although the kathina ceremony, which would fall
   under this general category, follows the pattern of a motion with
   one announcement.)  A typical example, apart from the kathina, would
   be if the Community receives a particularly fine piece of cloth and,
   instead of cutting it up to share the pieces out among the members,
   decides to present the entire piece to one of its members who has
   been especially helpful to the group.  This is one way in which the
   Community may reward a Community official for his services.

     Any member of the Community who disagrees with such a decision may
   prevent it from happening by protesting during the declaration.  The
   purpose of this rule is to prevent members of the Community from
   complaining, after the they have taken part in such a decision, that
   the Community was acting out of favoritism.

     The factors for the full offense are two.

     1) //Object//:  One has acted as part of a Community that has
   given robe-cloth to a bhikkhu who has been chosen, through a prior
   formal act, to be a Community official.

     2) //Effort//:  One complains afterwards that the Community acted
   out of favoritism.

     Object.  //Acting as part of a Community// means that one is in
   communion with the Community that handed over the cloth, and that
   one was in the same boundary with them:  i.e., one was either in the
   meeting or had given one's consent to it.

     //Robe-cloth// means a piece of any of the six kinds of allowable
   cloth, measuring at least four by eight fingerbreadths.

     The various permutations of articles and recipients are as
   follows:

     Complaining when the Community has given robe-cloth to a Community
       official:  a pacittiya.
     Complaining when the Community has given any other light article
       to a Community official:  a dukkata.
     Complaining when the Community has given any light article --
       cloth or otherwise -- to a bhikkhu who is not a Community
       official or to a novice:  a dukkata.

     Perception is not a mitigating factor here.  For example, if the
   recipient was made a Community official through a valid formal act,
   then regardless of how one perceives that act, it has no effect on
   the penalty under this rule.  (The Vibhanga is somewhat confusing on
   this point, not saying explicitly whether the factor of "perception
   with regard to the formal act" refers to the act by which the
   official was appointed or to the act by which the cloth was handed
   over to him.  The first interpretation, though, is the only one that
   makes sense in light of the no-offense clauses, and the K/Commentary
   confirms that it is the correct one.)

     Effort.  This factor is fulfilled by any expression of personal
   displeasure with the Community.  If, however, one accuses the
   Community of having carried out the act improperly -- not in
   accordance with the rule, or with an incomplete assembly -- the case
   would come not here, but under Pacittiya 63.

     Non-offenses.  The Vibhanga says that if the article //was// given
   out of habitual favoritism, anger, delusion, or fear, there is no
   offense in complaining, "What is the use of giving it to him?  After
   receiving it he'll ruin it; he won't take proper care of it."
   Notice, however, that even in cases of this sort one is allowed to
   criticize only the recipient, and not the Community -- for, after
   all, one had one's chance to protest during the meeting, but
   remained silent.

       Summary:  After participating in a formal act of the
       Community giving robe-cloth to a Community official:
       Complaining that the Community acted out of favoritism is a
       pacittiya offense.



                                 * * *

       82. Should any bhikkhu knowingly divert to an individual
       gains that had been allocated for the Community, it is to be
       confessed.

   This rule has already been explained under NP 30.

       Summary:  Persuading a donor to give to another individual a
       gift that he or she had planned to give to a Community --
       when one knows that it was intended for the Community -- is
       a pacittiya offense

                            * * * * * * * *